Amid all the hullabaloo that was generated by President Bush's designation of Paul Wolfowitz, then US deputy defence secretary, to succeed James Wolfensohn as World Bank president from June 2005, Wolfensohn's own record in leading the Bank over the past decade has so far escaped serious scrutiny.
Wolfensohn's was an ambitious presidency. Chosen by President Bill Clinton to head the world's largest multilateral lender in 1995, Australian-turned-American Wolfensohn promised to make the Bank more sensitive to the needs of developing countries. At the time, the institution was identified with the structural adjustment programmes that had wrenched apart developing country economies without bringing about growth, with controversial projects such as environmentally and socially destabilising land resettlement schemes in the Amazons and Indonesia and the construction of large dams, notable among which were the Arun III in Nepal and the Sardar Sarover in India.
At first, things appeared to go Wolfensohn's way. Assisted by a smooth public relations machine headed by ex-Economist writer Mark Malloch-Brown, Wolfensohn tried to recast the Bank's image as an institution that was not only moving away from structural adjustment, but was also making the elimination of poverty its central mission, along with the promotion of 'good governance' and environmentally sensitive lending. Channels to civil society were opened up, especially with the formation of the NGO Committee on the World Bank. However, many civil society organisations, like the 50 Years Is Enough network, complained that World Bank consultations with civil society were part of a divide-and-rule strategy that sought to separate 'reasonable' NGOs from 'unreasonable' ones. And, indeed, not a few influential NGOs were seduced by Wolfensohn's promise to overhaul the Bank's approach and programmes.
During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, Wolfensohn and chief economist Joseph Stiglitz successfully managed to steer popular opprobrium away from the Bank to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when Stiglitz and other Bank economists publicly questioned the wisdom of the capital account liberalisation policies promoted by the IMF and which had played such a key role in the crisis. The Bank also attempted to deflect criticisms about its own role in crisis management by attributing the roots of the Asian crisis to 'crony capitalism' in crisis-struck countries, thus gathering steam in its call for 'good governance'. roles, in particular, of the IMF and the World Bank. Headed by conservative US academic Alan Meltzer, the Commission came up with a number of devastating findings based on the Bank's own data: 70 per cent of the Bank's non-grant lending was concentrated in eleven member countries, with 145 other members left to scramble for the remaining 30 per cent; 80 per cent of the Bank's resources were devoted not to the poorest countries, but to the better-off ones that enjoyed positive credit ratings and could therefore raise their funds in international capital markets; the failure rate of Bank projects was 65-70 per cent in the poorest societies and 55-60 per cent in all developing countries. In short, the World Bank was irrelevant to the achievement of its avowed mission of alleviating global poverty. 1 Deprived of the public relations skills of Malloch-Brown, who had left to head the United Nations Development Programme, the Bank fumbled badly in its response. Much to the chagrin of Wolfensohn, few people came to the Bank's defence. Indeed, more interesting was that many critics from across the political spectrum -left, right and centre -agreed with the report's findings, though not necessarily with its key recommendation, which was to slim the Bank down into a World Development Authority to manage grant aid and to devolve its loan programmes to regional development banks. Among the critics was Wolfensohn's occasional ally, financial guru George Soros, who agreed with the conservative Meltzer that the Bank's 'lending business is inefficient, no longer appropriate, and in some ways counterproductive . . . and need[s] to be reformed to eliminate unintended adverse consequences'. 2 Meanwhile, the political aftermath of the Asian financial crisis wreaked havoc with the World Bank's stated aim of promoting good governance. This loudly proclaimed goal was contradicted by sensational revelations regarding the Bank's relationship with the Suharto regime in Indonesia -an involvement that continued well into the Wolfensohn era. A 'country of concentration' (in other words, a priority focus) for the Bank, some US$30 billion had been funnelled to the dictatorship over the previous thirty years. According to Jeffrey Winters and other Indonesia specialists, the Bank accepted false statistics; tolerated the fact that 30 cents in every dollar of aid it dispensed to the regime were siphoned off to corrupt uses; legitimised the dictatorship by passing it off as a model for other countries; and was complacent about the state of human rights and the Suharto clique's monopolistic control of the economy. 3 Suharto's loss of power in the tumultuous events of 1998-99 was paralleled by the erosion of the credibility of the World Bank's rhetoric about good governance.
The Bank took more hits as news of corruption and malpractice came to light in Bank-supported infrastructure projects. Prominent among these were the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) 70 Race & Class 47 (3) and the Bujagali Falls dam in Uganda. In 2001, the Lesotho high court started investigating charges of bribery against several major international dam-building companies and public officials in connection with the LHWP. Instead of supporting a nationally accountable legal process, the Bank quietly conducted its own internal investigation into three of the companies charged with paying bribes and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to punish them for corruption. But, in 2002, the Lesotho high court eventually succeeded in convicting four companies of paying bribes. Among them was Acres International, a long-term ally and favoured contractor of the World Bank, which had been cleared in the Bank's internal investigation. It took the World Bank well over a year to announce, eventually, that it would disbar Acres International from World Bank contracts for a period of three years. 4 Debt, poverty reduction and the environment A major World Bank-led initiative launched under Wolfensohn's watch (the plan to reduce Third World debt) also ran into trouble. The Bank initiative was designed to offset increasing demands for total debt cancellation for developing countries that had been mired in massive debt since the Third World debt crisis in the early 1980s. Declaring total cancellation unrealistic, the Bank called for debt reduction. It then sharply reduced the number eligible for such reduction to forty-two out of 165 developing countries, thus the term Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Further, the Bank stipulated that debt reduction for eligible countries would be granted by the big country creditors in exchange for 'economic reforms' undertaken by the debtors.
Trumpeted at the G-7 meeting in Cologne in July 1999, the HIPC initiative was in trouble a few years later. As it turned out, the initiative covered only 6.4 per cent of the total debt of the world's poorest countries, according to the calculations of the British charity Christian Aid. 5 Moreover, as of 2002, only twenty out of the forty-two countries eligible were able to comply with the conditions and policies imposed by the Bank and the IMF. Of these twenty, it was revealed that, despite reductions in their debt stock under the programme, four would actually have debt service payments in 2003-05 that would be higher than the annual debt service they had paid in 1998-2000; five countries would be paying as much in debt service as before HIPC; and six countries would have their annual debt service reduced by a modest US$15 million. 6 Responding to criticism that the actual debt reduction arising from the HIPC initiative would be meagre, the World Bank blamed the lower prices paid for developing country exports, but Bello & Guttal: Wolfensohn at the World Bank 71 admitted that half of the countries covered by the initiative would still have unsustainable debt loads at the end of the programme. 7 The Bank's report on the Status of Implementation of HIPC, published on 3 September 2002, showed that the Bank's strategy for countries in the HIPC programme of 'exporting themselves out of debt' through sales of their primary commodities did not work. Debt indicators worsened particularly for those countries dependent upon exports of cotton, cashew, fish and copper. However, apart from some fiddling with numbers here and there, 'sunset clauses' and 'completion points', the Bank left the HIPC strategy intact and made no effort to revise it in accordance with the evidence provided by its own internal reports. 8 Another initiative, promoted by Wolfensohn as a replacement for the much-discredited structural adjustment programmes that had been the Bank and IMF's main approach to development since the 1980s, was the implementation of poverty reduction strategy programmes (PRSPs). The rhetoric of change did not, however, match the reality of continuity, according to several studies conducted by civil society groups. As one exhaustive study conducted by the European Network on Debt and Development found, while PRSPs stress the importance of social safety nets and poverty reduction, the macroeconomic reforms prescribed to achieve them remained 'undiscussed' and indistinguishable from previous macroeconomic frameworks that focused on achieving rapid growth via liberalisation and privatisation. 9 Moreover, the much-vaunted 'participatory approach' of PRSPs has amounted to 'little more than consultations with a few prominent and liberal CSOs [civil society organisations] rather than substantive public dialogue about the causes and incidence of poverty'. 10 Even more searing in its conclusion was a detailed investigation of PRSPs in Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Cambodia, carried out by Focus on the Global South. This found the same one-size-fits-all formula of deregulation, liberalisation and commercialisation of land and resource rights: 'The PRSP is a comprehensive program for structural adjustment, in the name of the poor.' 11 Likewise, Wolfensohn's effort to convince the world that the World Bank was becoming an environmentally sensitive agency was stillborn. In 1990, many environmentalists had been dismayed when the Bank, one of the biggest lenders for environmentally destabilising infrastructure projects, became the lead agency of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), a multilateral channel for environment-related lending. Wolfensohn's actions, as opposed to his rhetoric, merely confirmed their fears. Under Wolfensohn, the Bank was a staunch backer of the controversial Chad-Cameroon pipeline, which would seriously damage ecologically fragile areas such as Cameroon's Atlantic littoral forest. Furthermore, Bank management was caught violating its own rules on environment and resettlement when it tried to push through the China Western Poverty Reduction Project, which would have transformed an arid ecosystem supporting minority Tibetan and Mongolian shepherds into agricultural land for people from other parts of China. Global pressure from civil society groups forced cancellation of some of the worst aspects of this programme, but other environmentally destabilising components were approved. 13 An examination of the Bank's loan portfolio carried out by the environmental group Friends of the Earth revealed the reality behind the rhetoric: loans for the environment as a percentage of total loans declined from 3.6 per cent in fiscal year 1994 to 1.02 per cent in 1998; funds allocated to environmental projects declined by 32.7 per cent between 1998 and 1999; and, in 1998, more than half of all lending by the World Bank's private sector divisions went to environmentally destabilising projects like large dams, roads and power plants.
14 Not surprisingly, at the GEF Assembly in New Delhi in 1998, the Bank came in for harsh criticism from an international expert panel for derailing GEF objectives. So marginalised within the bureaucracy were the Bank's environmental staff that Herman Daly, the distinguished ecological economist, left the Bank because he felt that he and other in-house environmentalists had such a minimal impact on agency policy.
Managing civil society
Opposition to projects with negative economic, social and environmental impacts triggered Wolfensohn's efforts to manage his civil society critics via 'constructive engagements' and 'multi-stakeholder dialogues'. Most prominent among these were the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), the World Commission on Dams (WCD) and the Extractive Industries Review (EIR). Although focused on different areas of Bank operations, all three initiatives sought to bring Bank critics around the negotiating table in a bid to prove that the Bank was willing to change, listen to its detractors and become more responsive to criticisms of its operations and policies. But the reality proved to be quite the opposite and, in all three cases, the Bank showed itself to be unwilling to accept and act progressively on the outcomes of these initiatives. A brief look at all three proves instructive for those who maintain illusions that dialogue with the Bank will result in a substantive change in its policies and operations. accepted a civil society challenge to conduct a three-pronged World Bank, civil society and government assessment of structural adjustment programmes in the field; that is, at both local and national levels. Wolfensohn arrived at the World Bank in 1995, just as the 50 Years Is Enough campaign was gathering steam. A merger of economic justice and environmental groups that targeted the Bank's disastrous record over structural adjustment programmes, infrastructure and energy projects, the 50 Years campaign and the media coverage it generated threatened Wolfensohn's presidency before he had even begun his term of office. In an attempt to defuse the attacks from external critics and possibly to signal the dawn of a 'new' World Bank, Wolfensohn agreed to enter into the SAPRI initiative, which was finally launched in 1997.
SAPRI was designed as a tripartite, field-based exercise; a civil society team worked with a Bank team appointed by Wolfensohn to develop a transparent and participatory global methodology for gathering and documenting evidence of the impacts of World Bank-IMF structural adjustment programmes in seven countries. This methodology included local workshops, national forums and field investigations. The process was also undertaken by civil society organisations in two additional countries where the Bank and national governments refused to participate.
Despite agreement on the common rules of the exercise and the review methodology, the World Bank team played an obstructionist role throughout the SAPRI process. For example, at public forums, instead of trying to listen to and learn from the evidence presented by civil society representatives about the impacts of structural adjustment programmes, Bank staff almost always argued points made, finally claiming that the presentations at such forums (previously agreed to be qualitative input) constituted only 'anecdotal evidence'. Similarly, while civil society representatives at the national level tended to accept joint research findings, despite expressing reservations, the Bank almost always found extensive faults in the draft reports. Concerning Bangladesh, for example, the Bank set down over fifty pages of objections to a joint report that covered four or five topics. Civil society groups, however, remained firm that the Bank should adhere to the commitments it had made to the methodology and process and pushed ahead with field investigations from which an increasing amount of data started to emerge about the impacts of structural adjustment programmes from farmers, workers, women's and indigenous peoples' organisations -and even governmental bodies. Many government departments participated in good faith in these investigations, although they remained nervous about the Bank's willingness to accept the findings.
As the Bank's ability to control country processes decreased, so also did its ability to control the output of the review. Even before the final and concluding national forums were reached, field investigations already indicated major problems in all aspects of adjustment programmes, from trade and financial sector liberalisation to the privatisation of utilities and labour market reforms. Reluctant to go public with these findings, the Bank team backed off from an earlier (written) agreement to present all SAPRI findings at a large public forum in Washington, DC, with Wolfensohn present. Instead, the Bank team insisted on a closed technical meeting and a small session in Washington, DC, scheduled for when Wolfensohn was not in town. Most importantly, the Bank now insisted that it and civil society organisations each write separate reports. The Bank's report used the Bank's own commissioned research as the basis for its conclusions and barely referred to the now five-year-long SAPRI process. In August 2001, the Bank pulled out of SAPRI, burying the entire exercise. Despite saying that it had learned a lot from SAPRI, it did not commit itself to reshaping its lending policies based on the SAPRI findings.
On 15 April 2002, the full SAPRI report (under the name of SAPRIN -that is the SAPRI network -to include findings from the two countries where civil society organisations conducted investigations without Bank involvement) was released to the public and received immense media coverage. The Bank entered the fray again and Wolfensohn requested a meeting with SAPRIN members. He expressed regrets that he and his staff had not been in touch with SAPRI and promised to read the report and discuss it seriously in the near future. To date, however, neither the Bank nor Wolfensohn has shown any commitment to review and make changes to their adjustment lending. On the contrary, structural adjustment policies continue to be the mainstay of World Bank-IMF lending through PRSPs and poverty reduction and growth facilities (PRGFs).
As with SAPRI, so with the WCD, which also proved to be a thorn in the Bank's side. Established in 1997 following a meeting convened in Gland, Switzerland, by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the WCD was the first body to conduct a comprehensive and independent global review of the development effectiveness of large dams and to propose internationally acceptable standards to improve the assessment, planning, building, operating and financing of large dam projects. Although the WCD was co-sponsored by the World Bank, its origins lie in the numerous anti-dam struggles waged by affected communities and NGOs around the world, in particular those targeting World Bank-funded projects from the mid-1980s onwards. Chaired by the then South African minister of water resources Kader Asmal, the WCD was comprised of twelve eminent Bello & Guttal: Wolfensohn at the World Bank 75 commissioners and included representatives from the dam-building industry, anti-dam struggles, indigenous peoples' movements, civil society organisations, the public sector and academia. Over a period of two-and-a-half years, the WCD commissioned a massive volume of research and received nearly 1,000 submissions from around the world on the environmental, social, economic, technical, institutional and performance dimensions of large dams. The work of the Commission was monitored by the WCD Forum, which consisted of representatives from research institutions, NGOs, donor governments, the private sector and multilateral institutions including the World Bank.
The WCD's final report Dams and Development: a new framework for decision-making was launched by Nelson Mandela in London in November 2000. Despite deep differences in the backgrounds and political perspectives among all those involved in the WCD process, the report was widely acclaimed as a non-partisan and progressive framework for decision-making over future water and energy planning.
Although the WCD worked independently from the World Bank, the Bank played a more active role than any other institution in the development of the report. Bank representatives were active members of the WCD Forum and the Bank was consulted at every stage of the WCD's work programme. Wolfensohn even lauded the WCD process as a model for future multi-stakeholder dialogues. However, this rhetoric did not translate into commitments to learn from the evidence gathered by the WCD or to apply the new guidelines proposed in its report.
While the WCD report was welcomed by bilateral donors, other multilateral banks (such as the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank) and even some industry associations (such as the International Commission on Large Dams), the World Bank's response displayed a shocking lack of commitment to learning from past mistakes. Indeed, it even misrepresented the findings of the report. At the report's launch in November 2000, Wolfensohn revealed that the Bank would consult its shareholders for their opinions. The Bank's subsequent position on the report was based primarily on the responses of dam-building government agencies in the major dambuilding countries, which rejected its findings and guidelines, deeming them inapplicable and even anti-development. On 27 March 2001, the Bank stated that: 'Consistent with the clarification provided by the WCD Chair, the World Bank will not ''comprehensively adopt the 26 WCD guidelines'', but will use them as a reference point when considering investments in dams.' 16 It went on to claim that:
This was an unprecedented and highly productive dialogue between all parties. The World Bank believes that such dialogues are very 76 Race & Class 47 (3) important for the many controversial development issues, and will continue to engage in them in the future. 17 Yet, in 2001, when the World Bank embarked on a review of its resettlement policy and a new Water Resources Sector Strategy (WRSS), it did not incorporate the recommendations of the WCD report in any meaningful way in either document. On the contrary, both policies, as formulated, reflected a lowering of Bank standards concerning the social, environmental and economic dimensions of Bank-supported projects. In a letter to Wolfensohn, dated 12 July 2002, the twelve WCD commissioners pointed out that:
Given that a major thrust of the WRSS is to recommend that the Bank actively re-engage in financing large-scale dams (referred to in the WRSS as high-reward/high-risk hydraulic infrastructure), we think that it is unwise to dismiss without justification or explanation the recommendations of the first-ever global review of dams reached through consensus and developed through an extensive participatory process with support from the World Bank. 18 The experience of the WCD was relived in yet another 'dialogue between all parties' during the EIR. The EIR was announced in September 2000 during the World Bank-IMF annual meeting in Prague. Challenged at a public meeting by Ricardo Navarro, international director of Friends of the Earth, on the impacts of oil, mining and gas projects financed by the World Bank, Wolfensohn responded, to the surprise of his staff, that the Bank would undertake a global review to examine whether Bank involvement in extractive industries was consistent with its stated aim of poverty reduction. Led by Indonesia's former environment minister Emil Salim (himself a controversial figure in the eyes of peoples' environmental movements), the EIR process proved less thorough, less independent and less participatory than the WCD process. Perhaps as a consequence of some of the lessons learnt from the WCD process, which was then concluding, the World Bank attempted to keep a much tighter hold on EIR research and consultations. Despite protests from peoples' movements and NGOs involved in the EIR, Bank staff remained active in scrutinising inputs into the review process. Peoples' movements and NGOs, however, fought hard to ensure that factual information about the impacts of extractive industries on different constituencies were fed into the EIR.
The EIR report was published in Lisbon on 11 December 2003 and, despite Bank interference, turned out to be a surprisingly outspoken document. Although the report did not respond to all the concerns and demands expressed by peoples' movements and NGOs, it strongly recommended that the Bank and its private sector arm, the InterBello & Guttal: Wolfensohn at the World Bank 77 national Finance Corporation (IFC), phase out their involvement in oil, mining and natural gas within five years and shift their financing to renewable energy. The report led to an outcry on the part of several private financiers (such as Citibank, ABN Amro, WestLB and Barclays), who saw Bank involvement in the oil, mining and gas industries as essential to their financing of such projects.
As with the WCD report, the World Bank ignored many of the EIR report's important recommendations. Following its release, the World Bank management's response to the report (prepared on behalf of Wolfensohn) was leaked. The Bank flatly rejected the ambitious proposal that it phase out its involvement in extractive industries by 2008. The Bank's response argued that: 'Adopting this policy would not be consistent with the World Bank Group mission of helping to fight poverty and improve the living standards of people in the developing world.' Ending the financing of oil projects, it claimed, 'would unfairly penalise small and poor countries that need the revenues from their oil resources to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty'. As an example, the report cited Chad and Cameroon, where the Bank, despite vociferous opposition by local communities and environmental groups, has financed an oil pipeline that has been dogged by controversy about violations of human rights and environmental standards. 19 The Bank argued, somewhat strangely, that it should remain directly involved in extractive industries because it could ensure compliance with social and environmental standards, notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary.
Quizzed about the Bank's response to the EIR report at an awards ceremony at Georgetown University in Washington, DC on 25 February 2004, Wolfensohn replied that he had not seen it before it had been leaked. He also claimed that he had learned that the report was not a consensual document and that the Bank also had an obligation to respond to those involved in the process who were not part of the represented consensus. Here, too, was a repeat of the post-WCD scenario, with Wolfensohn hiding behind 'countries of the South' rhetoric. Because governments of the South did not accept the EIR's recommendations, the World Bank would not make a firm commitment to implement many of the recommendations, such as respecting human rights or ensuring that oil, gas or mining projects did not go ahead without free, prior and informed consent from local indigenous peoples.
On 9 February 2004, in Melbourne, Wolfensohn was presented with a letter from five Nobel laureates, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Jody Williams, Sir Joseph Rotblat, Betty Williams and Mairead Maguire, asking him to adopt the recommendations of the EIR. 'We urge you in the strongest possible terms to embrace the spirit of the report and accept the recommendations in their entirety when devising a strategy for moving forward', stated the letter. It went on:
War, poverty, climate change, greed, corruption, and ongoing violations of human rights -all of these scourges are all too often linked to the oil and mining industries. Your efforts to create a world without poverty need not exacerbate these problems. The Review provides you an extraordinary opportunity to direct the resources of the World Bank Group in a way that is truly oriented towards a better future for all humanity. 20 Yet, though the Bank had been an initiator and sponsor of both the WCD and EIR, it refused to adopt their findings even in principle, hiding behind the opposition of its larger developing country clients such as China and India. In late 2004, the World Bank announced that it would implement a new framework within which to address the social and environmental impacts of the projects it finances. Its 'country systems' approach would henceforth rely mainly on borrower governments' social and environmental standards and systems (for example, a country's own relevant national, sub-national or sectoral implementing institutions, and applicable laws, regulations, rules, procedures and track records) rather than the Bank's declared safeguard policies for project implementation. Although the Bank is, in any case, expected to comply with national requirements, its existing safeguard policies provide at least a minimum set of standards by which the Bank's commitment to environmental and social sustainability can be assessed, notwithstanding the fact that these are rarely complied with even by Bank staff themselves. The new 'country systems' approach will, it is expected, let the Bank off the hook from such assessments, since it can now conveniently claim that it is driven by the wishes and needs of its borrowers rather than its own centralised policies.
The years in the wilderness
It is clear that it was following the advent of a right-wing administration at the White House in 2001 that the hitherto liberal Wolfensohn's future became uncertain. Partisans of his nemesis Meltzer were ultimately in control.
Wolfensohn spent his last four years in office steadily acquiescing to the Bush administration's 'bilateralisation' of the World Bank programme to support its wars of aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, aside from pledging US$570 million and fronting the US effort to raise billions of dollars for reconstruction, Wolfensohn expressed interest in the Bank's participation in financing a fuel pipeline to channel massive gas reserves through Afghanistan from landlocked Turkmenistan to India or Pakistan, a project greatly desired Bello & Guttal: Wolfensohn at the World Bank 79 by US energy corporations, backed by US vice-president Richard Cheney. 21 In Iraq, Wolfensohn, prodded by Washington, committed US$3-5 billion for reconstruction and agreed to manage the Iraq Trust Fund set up to channel money to development projects undertaken by the occupying regime, especially those aimed at 'capacity building' in the private sector, a priority aim of the Bush administration. Nonetheless, he could not prevent the erosion of his authority and prestige. Distrusted by the White House as a Clinton appointee, he was also regarded by developing country governments as a lame duck whose reformist rhetoric no longer conformed to the unilateralist thrust of US government policy. Who did he represent, many asked?
Then came the scandal that was the Wolfowitz appointment. In a very real sense, James Wolfensohn's reputation was salvaged by George Bush. So rampant was the fear of Bush's appointee that Wolfensohn's tenure, on his departure, came to be viewed through rose-tinted glasses; there is the prospect of his being canonised as a patron of development.
What can we learn from the Wolfensohn era at the World Bank? At several junctures during his presidency, Wolfensohn had in his hands an opportunity at least to slow down the Bank's destructive trajectory, even if not to turn it around. He had the (albeit cautious) commitment of the Bank's fiercest critics to an objective review of Bank policies, programmes and projects in a bid to halt its worst excesses. But Wolfensohn converted what could have been a potential victory for the Bank into unmitigated defeat. The Bank now stands discredited not only for not meeting its own stated goal of 'creating a world free of poverty', but also for its inability and unwillingness to keep its word and meet the commitments it made publicly through its various 'multistakeholder dialogues'. Now, even more than before, the World Bank is associated with double-speak, dithering and duplicity.
Arguably, the most important lesson to be learned from the Wolfensohn decade is that the World Bank is much too large and politically motivated an institution and is too central to the structure of USled global capitalism to be changed by a single individual, even one as charismatic and shrewd as James Wolfensohn. In the last instance, the Bank serves as an extension of US corporate and strategic interests. Wolfensohn could only modify its performance at the margins. Now even that slight room for manoeuvre has been eliminated with the appointment of Paul Wolfowitz, whose name is synonymous with hardline unilateralism.
80 Race & Class 47 (3) 
